The Pro se Problem in Family Courts - Ohio

In Maine and Connecticut there is a movement to change the Family Court system. Ohio is no different than these other two states. While this letter is addressed to the Maine Judicial branch it can be applied to other states just as well:

Mary Ann Lynch
Government and Media Counsel
Maine Judicial Branch

Dear Mary Ann,

It was a pleasure to talk with you by phone on Wednesday afternoon and to share a few thoughts about the very troubling 74% ‘pro se’ problem in Maine’s family courts. 74% is a powerful number that speaks to a socially unacceptable differential status of citizens/voters in the face of  justice. My purpose in calling you was  to be a “catalyst” for broad based problem-solving concerning the ‘pro se’ phenomenon. It seems to be growing numerically by leaps and bounds, despite valiant, well-documented efforts by your associates to contain it.

To me, as a former public health planner, there appears to be a lack of data about the nature of this problem that would be a vital necessity in designing a strategic intervention to reduce this unacceptable 74% number. The problem of ‘pro se’ numbers also appears to suffer (paradoxically) from well-intended attempts to try to solve the ‘pro’ se’ problem with inadequate problem definition. It puts “answers to the problem” before adequate “problem definition”, and thereby places the cart in front of the horse. Without wishing to disparage the ongoing work being attempted by those associated with the Maine Judicial Branch and the Maine Bar, I would suggest that there are some serious planning questions that need research and study before seeking answers.

Here, in brief, are a few of my thoughts, a recap and elaboration on our earlier phone discussion:

WHAT SHOULD THE GOALS FOR  ANY ‘PRO SE’ INTERVENTION BE? In any thoughtful, large scale, organized government plan, one needs clearly stated goals to aim for- and to keep the movement towards goals on target. I would suggest- tentatively - that the aim for the ‘pro se’ problem should be to reduce the incidence and prevalence of ‘pro se’ as a phenomenon in Maine family courts - “to move the “numbers needle” backwards”. To use a public health conceptualization, one might say ‘pro se’ is a growing epidemiological problem. What is the “epidemic” about, how is it spread over Maine’s “at risk” populations, who is vulnerable, what factors are causing it, what exacerbates its growth, what diminishes its growth and what “interventions” might well organized data suggest would be most effective? To that end, I suggest a sample of some very generic questions that an epidemiologist might ask before intervening in any epidemic.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF MAINE’S FAMILY COURT ‘PRO SE’ PROBLEM? Beyond anecdote, who are the 74% of people who do ‘pro se’’ in Maine’s family courts? What sort of demographics do they represent? What ages, occupations, education levels, financial status, duration of marriage, number of children, geographic locations, previous marriages/relationships, health/mental health status?  What are the reasons that they are  doing ‘pro se’?  Financial reasons (examples)? Or other reasons?  All of these data would be useful tools in shaping rational problem-solving. Without such data, solving problems can only be based on anecdote, guess work, personal impressions, prejudice and bias. Bad information, as everyone knows, leads to bad answers!

DOES HAVING A LAWYER MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN OUTCOME OF DIVORCE AND CUSTODY? What is the statistical record for various types of outcomes for ‘pro se’ litigants? How do things go when one party has a lawyer and the other doesn’t? What factors favor what outcome when both parties have a lawyer? Are there statistics for law firms and lawyers showing records of wins and losses? How do ‘pro se’’, lawyers, and judges view the contest?

HOW DO ‘PRO SE’ LITIGANTS FEEL ABOUT THEIR COURT EXPERIENCE? Were they helped to do pre-court paperwork? Was the help that they received effective or was it confusing? Did they get help or coaching before going to court? From what kinds of helping sources? How do ‘pro se’ litigants feel about their courtroom experience?  Were they put at ease by the judge? Were they treated respectfully? Did they encounter judicial hostility or overt rejection? Were they listened to? How did they handle evidentiary challenges (“object, object, object!”) from opposing counsel? Were they included in all conferences and administrative issues? Did they feel that they received treatment in court equal to opposing counsel (if there was one)? Do they have ideas for simplifying the process for making it less time consuming, fairer and with happier resolution? How were they and their children impacted by the personal stress of the  ‘pro se’ experience and its  aftermath?

HOW DO FAMILY COURT JUDGES FEEL ABOUT THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH ‘PRO SE’ LITIGANTS? What kinds of problems do they experience? What impact does ‘pro se’ have on courtroom procedures and process? What are the biggest challenges in this situation for judges? What would they suggest to solve some of the problems associated with ‘pro se’? Do they have suggestions that might diminish the incidence of ‘pro se’ ?

HOW DOES THE DIVORCE BAR SEE THE ‘PRO SE’ PROBLEM? Does everyone in a divorce and custody situation need a lawyer? What type of cases may not need a lawyer?  What about pre-court legal “coaching”? What about paraprofessional lawyers? What about defining custody as 50-50 in all cases- except proven abuse? What other ideas? What about disincentives for lawyers? What about fee caps on all cases, or needing certification from a judge to bill beyond a certain $$ figure?

Please, do not take the preceding paragraphs as any sort of concrete proposal. The remarks above are offered only as possible examples of epidemiological data for use in a very classic, rational problem solving process. The questions are more to get a conversation about planning going- or to say, we don’t want to go there, because...

To my thinking, all three branches of government should be involved in any such a conversation leading to a plan for action. The core issue at the heart of the ‘pro se’ problem problem is about how we are to treat Maine families and children in the throes of divorce and custody. It is a question about the well being of a  sub-population of huge importance to the future of Maine. Interest in the topic goes way beyond the interest and practices of one branch of government and one profession. Ideally all three branches of government should work on the issue and should sponsor the supportive legislation to enable the work. As to the question of who might  best do such a study or variations thereof in the interest of the public, my vote would be for OPEGA; others might have other choices. My personal aim would be to eliminate the dominance of “special interests” of stake holders from the “divorce industry”, who have been the dominant players heretofore. They don’t represent the people.

I hope this gives a bit more flesh on the bare bones we discussed on Wednesday? It is still skeletal!  It is just a beginning of a much needed larger conversation.

Thanks for your time, your always valuable perspective and your in depth knowledge of the Judicial Branch - and Maine government.

Sincerely,

Jerry Collins

CC: MeGALert

If you have had a bad experience in the Family Court systems or with a Guardian ad litem. Please contact us at MeGALalert@gmail.com or find us on Facebook.

The Judicial Branch Dilemma in GAL Management

In thinking about why the Judicial Branch has such difficulty in creating a management system for its GAL program, a number of conceptual and structural impediments come to mind. The most readily acknowledged issue is no money for supervision or for a bureaucratic structure that would allow for normal bureaucratic management of Guardians ad litem (GAL). The financial excuse is probably true given the dire financial straights of the state, but we would say in addition that even were money available, there are more serious conceptual impediments preventing Judicial Branch’s internal management of Guardians ad litem. There are at least three conceptual issues that would make supervision or management of Guardians ad litem in any Judicial system fraught with legal and ethical problems unique to judicial branches of government.

The issues involve internal conflicts inherent in normal organizational role shifts, within a judicial system, from the role of supervision of vocational functioning of a supervisee to the administration of justice in cases involving complaints about supervision which seek legal solutions. Both GAL management and adjudication of formal, legal complaints about a Guardian’s management get very complex when these inherently conflicting activities have to occur within the same, small, fairly tight system. It would require a tight control over supervisory information and rigid compartmentalization of this information, so that information about supervision and management - and any conflict therein - does not seep into formal adjudication channels and pollute the fairness of any possible, future legal complaint process. Can it be done?

1.) Judicial Independence. In the spirit of Common Law, a judge is supposed to form his/her judgment about a case independently, uninfluenced (unswayed) by other branches of government or by partisan, community (or bureaucratic) politics.

This means standing apart from and being independent of politics and influence from the other branches of government. It should include not only formal political influence of the branches, but also government bureaucratic influences, including those of the judge’s own internal bureaucracy. This means using data presented in court by both parties to form an independent opinion and not to be swayed by outside influences or outside information or previous knowledge of the case. It would be difficult for a judge to resolve independently legal actions of any kind involving a Guardian ad litem; especially, a GAL with whom he/she has worked in court or even one who is known to the judicial system. Judicial independence gets damaged by foreknowledge of the GAL, by working relationships, by the rumors, by system gossip, by the system grapevines and by private awareness of the contentions.
 

A theoretical problem might start with supervisory discord between a GAL and his/her supervisor about an issue of supervision, leading to an internal management hearing and subsequently pursued in a formal court complaint. It might go the full route in court and continue as a case of higher level appeal. Administrative supervision within any such JB system - if there were conflicts - might at some point be apt to tangle with the branches’ system for administering formal justice, as those with supervisory grievances may seek legal appeal. It poses a huge bureaucratic challenge to keep information from these supervision and justice boundaries clean, separate and non-communicating in a single, small bureaucracy. This is a very special supervisory problem (unique?) for judicial systems, one that is not faced by administrative bureaucracies in other branches of government. Judicial independence, while an active member of a bureaucratic branch of government is challenging to say the least.

Having a non-judge be supervisor of a GAL would necessitate a bureaucracy to supervise the supervisor, a supervisory appellate process for conflicts arising out of supervision, and links within the same system to the judiciary for conflicts that "go legal". Judicial independence in Judicial Branches would necessitate a “Rube Goldberg” organizational structure and be strained to the degree that all judges would have to adopt an antisocial, personal ‘modus operandi’ to avoid contamination of their independence by normal internal organizational grapevines and normal organizational politics. And this would have to be at all times for perhaps an actually limited number of internal legal complaints. Can independence of one’s home bureaucracy be carried out, always, with any kind of credibility? What sort of person would avoid all informal social communications with system wide colleagues to be judicially independent? It is an example of the latent conflicting strains between supervision and legal functions within the same system that inevitably impinge on judicial independence.

2.) Judicial Impartiality. There are special challenges to maintaining judicial impartiality when one sits in formal judgment of a person who works in the same bureaucratic system, who is appointed by colleagues, who works for colleagues and friends in that system, who may be known personally or by reputation or rumor. The potential role conflicts and/or impartiality conflicts would seem enormous when colleagues, friends, coworkers must attempt to render impartial judgment. Can it happen? Can one have oversight of a working colleague (and at the same time maintain impartiality), with the unavoidable risk that the working colleague might at some point go to law with a formal complaint for some sort of problem resolution, which cannot be resolved in supervision? It is another serious conceptual impediment to the Judicial Branch system supervising or having oversight of GALs.

3.) Due Process. Implies that in a conflict, all parties and the judge will share in common, knowledge about the complaint and the case at the same time, and that everyone has equal opportunities to respond to all steps in the process. No one has the special advantage of being able to use secret information unknown to the other players or privately to exert undue influence. Well run courts are scrupulous about keeping all relevant information shared by all participants and to avoid ‘ex parte’ communications so no one has use of special knowledge not available to the others. Information has a power of its own to determine or influence outcomes. The idea of protecting due process poses special challenges to the hypothetical idea of supervision or of oversight within a judicial system, where all supervisory and oversight information would have to be kept rigidly apart from the justice side to avoid contaminating possible future due process in a hypothetical legal complaint from the same players. Can any organization - even a formal espionage organization - implement this degree of control over information that is internal to one part of the system in order to prevent seepage into another part of the same system?

These ideas are just a few conceptual and system reasons, why it is virtually an impossibility for the JB to construct a system of GAL oversight without violating very important traditional principles that are embedded in administering the law. This is not in any way to suggest that these principles are not vitally important and necessary in a court of law and need to be respected. It is simply to try to understand why these same respected principles that work so well in court render supervision of GALs virtually impossible in Judicial systems. It is the reason why many states have surrendered to the impossibility of doing supervision/oversight within their judicial branch and moved these activities to the administrative/executive branch.

Ohio should do this for the same reasons.

For more information on the issues of Guardians ad litem we encourage you to read the Maine 2006 OPEGA report. This is an excellten resource for what is typically wrong with GAL programs. Provided is a link to a summary – OPEGA. In addition there is the report the Power of the Powerless which addresses many of the same issues. If you have had any issues with Guardians ad litem we encourage you to contact us for support at NationalGALalert@gmail.com or like us on Facebook for information.